This paper investigates the human capital eects of a statutory law reform granting Kenyan women equal inheritance rights. I employ a dierence-in-dierences strategy, exploiting variation in pre-reform inheritance rights across religious groups. I nd that a variety of human capital outcomes are aected: women exposed to the reform are more educated, both in absolute terms and relative to males; they are less likely to undergo genital mutilation and more likely to be medically assisted during childbirth; they tend to delay marriage and childbearing, and to have better marriage market outcomes. I provide robustness checks by showing that these improvements occur across ethnic groups, regardless of initial education level, and are more pronounced for women with fewer siblings, for whom the absolute inheritance share is potentially larger. There is suggestive evidence that women exposed to the reform participate more in family decisions, indicating that improved bargaining power might be the main channel. These ndings suggest that legal recognition of women's inheritance rights can be benecial for women even in a context of poor enforcement and in spite of the persistence of deep-rooted social norms. JEL: J12, J16, K36, O12, D1
Introduction
In numerous countries across the developing world, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, gender discrimination takes the form of unequal inheritance and property rights. As inheritance is one of the main ways for women to acquire and control property, women's legal inability to inherit property can signicantly undermine their economic security and independence, as well as their access to economic opportunities (World Bank, 2011 Bank, , 2012 . Among initiatives aimed at remedying such discrimination, development practitioners and international organizations have been advocating legal reforms establishing equal de jure rights in matters of inheritance and family law. This view is illustrated in the 2012 World Bank Gender Equality and Development Report, according to which the most promising policies to increase women's voice in households center on reforming the legal framework (...): land laws and aspects of family law that govern marriage, divorce, and disposal of property are particularly important (World Bank, 2012) . Legal reforms are further claimed to have the potential to improve economic outcomes and strengthen women's economic empowerment (World Bank, 2011) . Quantitative evidence on the eects of reforms of this type remains, however, scant, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa 1 . A priori, it is not obvious that such policy initiatives benet women: rst, legal reform alone may do little to change women's de facto rights, particularly in contexts where legal enforcement is poor and social norms strongly oppose women holding property (UN- HABITAT, 2006; Human Rights Watch, 2003; USAID, 2003) . Second, if women are granted improved property rights on physical assets, other household members may respond by engaging in compensatory behavior, putting women in a disadvantage with respect to other margins. For instance, as well as Rosenblum (2015) nd evidence that parents substitute land inheritance and human capital investments, the two major forms of intergenerational wealth transfer in developing countries. This paper studies the human capital eects of a statutory law reform granting Kenyan women equal inheritance rights, exploiting variation in pre-reform inheritance rights across religious groups.
Before the 1981 Law of Succession Act, inheritance in Kenya was determined by the customary law of the ethnic group of the deceased, and, in the case of Muslims, by Koranic law. The customary law of virtually all ethnic groups in Kenya denies women any right of inheritance, whereas Islamic law entitles women to half of the inheritance share that goes to each of their brothers. The 1981 reform made inheritance a matter of statutory law, and formally established equal inheritance rights for men and women, regardless of religious aliation. In 1990 pressure by the Islamic community induced the government to create an exemption for Muslims, who were allowed to revert to Koranic succession law. I exploit the timing of the 1981 reform and subsequent 1990 amendment, as well as cross-sectional variation in religious aliation, in order to estimate the causal impact of the reform on a variety of outcomes related to human capital and household decision making, in a dierencein-dierences framework. An interesting feature of this setting is that the reform was amended for one of the two groups, creating three distinct regimes throughout the period of study. This allows me to estimate two eects: the impact of the full reform -increasing women's inheritance share 1 As discussed below, existing evidence on gender-neutral inheritance rules is mostly based on the Hindu Succession Act in India relative to men's from 0 to 1 -and the impact of the incremental reform -increasing this share from 0.5 to 1.
Drawing upon a rich set of outcomes from the Kenyan Demographic and Health Surveys, I nd signicant improvements along several dimensions, particularly in women's education and health.
Women exposed to the reform are more educated, both in absolute terms and relative to males.
Switching from a regime with no inheritance rights to equal inheritance rights (i.e. the full reform)
is associated with a 20 percentage point increase in primary school completion rates for females, and with a 14 percentage point decrease in the same outcome for males. Women exposed to the full reform are also 19 percentage points less likely to undergo genital mutilation, and 7 percentage points more likely to receive medical assistance during pregnancy and childbirth. Moreover, they tend to delay marriage and childbearing and are matched to higher-quality husbands. These ndings are compatible with both an investment and a bargaining power mechanism: on the one hand, as women have the ability to inherit physical capital, parents might decide to invest more in their human capital, if they view human and physical capital as complementary. On the other hand, the ability to inherit improves women's bargaining power and shifts human capital investment choices towards their preferences. While I cannot fully disentangle these mechanisms, I attempt to examine the latter channel by considering more direct proxies for women's household bargaining power, based on survey questions on decision making and attitudes. I nd suggestive evidence that the reform makes women more likely to participate in family decisions, supporting the interpretation that women's bargaining power is indeed enhanced. My identication strategy is complemented by several additional checks. In particular, when available, I exploit information on number of siblings as a source of treatment heterogeneity, showing that the eects of the reform are less pronounced when a woman has a large number of siblings -and hence a smaller potential inheritance. I also show that there is no statistically signicant dierence in outcomes between Muslims and non-Muslims for households in districts that were exempt from the 1981 reform.
This work relates to two strands of the literature: that on intra-household decision making and that on intergenerational transfers.
In a non-unitary household, the allocation of resources between spouses will aect intra-household bargaining and associated socio-economic outcomes. Women's ability to control resources has been shown to translate into larger investments in children's education, health and nutrition in a variety of contexts (Duo, 2003; Qian, 2008; Luke and Munshi, 2011 ). 2
The importance of family law for household bargaining has been emphasized by Chiappori et al. (2002) , who view the intra-household distribution of power as aected by outside opportunities, including legislation on the assignment of property rights in case of divorce. A number of empirical papers have examined the impact of family law in developing contexts. Ambrus et al. (2010) study the link between the value of dowry and prenuptial agreements and changes in family laws concerning polygamy and divorce. Carranza (2012) studies how changes in Islamic family and 2 A number of papers focus specically on women's physical asset ownership, documenting how this correlated with better health and education outcomes for their children (Katz and Chamorro, 2003; Quisumbing and Maluccio, 2003) . In the context of urban China, Wang (2014) shows that transferring ownership rights to women leads to less consumption of male goods in the household. 3 inheritance law in Indonesia have aected fertility behavior and son preference.
Several recent papers have considered specically gender-progressive changes in inheritance laws, by focusing on the Indian Hindu Succession Act. Most papers in this literature exploit variation in the timing of the reform across states in conjunction with the timing of the death of a woman's male family members. 3 This reform has been found to be associated with an increase in female education (Goyal et al., 2013; Roy, 2015) , increased autonomy and labor supply (Heath and Tan, 2015) , and greater bargaining power (Mookerjee, 2015) . However, other studies nd that women were made worse o under other dimensions: Anderson and Genicot (2015) show that the reform led to more suicides and wife beating, and interpret this as resulting from greater conict over property within the household; Rosenblum (2015) nds evidence of higher female mortality, as parents substitute investments in human capital and land bequests. Overall, it is unclear whether women beneted in net terms from the reform and how this would generalize to other contexts.
Inter-generational transfers have been viewed mostly through the lens of the wealth model (Becker and Tomes, 1979) or the strategic bequest model (Bernheim et al., 1985) . In the context of developing countries, a number of empirical papers has examined the interaction between traditional kinship systems and inheritance rules, emphasizing how parents rationally incorporate social norms which constrain their ability to make bequests (Goetghebuer and Platteau, 2010; La Ferrara, 2007; Mobarak et al. 2009; Platteau and Baland, 2001) . La Ferrara and Milazzo (2014) look at strategic responses of matrilineal and patrilineal ethnic groups to an amendment to Ghana's Intestate Succession law, nding that parents substitute bequests with education. 4
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the 1981 Kenyan Law of Succession and subsequent amendment, and provides additional background information on the Kenyan context. Section 3 outlines a conceptual framework for interpreting the eects of the reform under study. In sections 4 and 5 I present my empirical strategy and data sources and in section 6 I discuss my results. Section 7 concludes.
Background
Kenya is a fractionalized country in which ethnic and religious cleavages are salient. According to the 2009 Census, Kenya has a population of 38 million, subdivided in as many as 133 ethnic aliations, according to the Census disaggregation. The 2009 Census reports that 83% of Kenya's inhabitants are Christians -of which 23% Catholics and 57% Protestants -and 11% Muslims. The remaining 6% is divided among traditional religions, no religion and Hinduism (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, 2010). These gures have been widely disputed by the Muslim community, who has claimed to be selectively under-reported by the government. A more plausible gure for 3 Although the Hindu Succession Act aected Muslims and non-Muslims dierently, much like the Kenyan Law of Succession Act examined in this paper, the identication strategy in the papers discussed below is mostly based on variation within Hindus. 4 A similar nding is that of and , who study the eects of the evolution of land tenure institutions and matrilineal inheritance practices on agricultural and schooling investments in Ghana and in Sumatra.
the Muslim population has been suggested to lie between 20 and 30% (The Daily Nation, 2010).
Kenya's Muslims are not a homogeneous group, as they comprise converts from dierent ethnic groupings, among which notably Somalis and some other nomadic groups, Arabs and people of mixed Arab-African descent. Most Muslims live in the Coastal Province, where their sense of common identity is strongest (Oded, 2000) .
Sub-Saharan Africa represents a unique setting for studying women's property rights, as land and family rights are governed by multiple and overlapping legal domains. In Kenya, property rights are dened by a complex interplay of customary law, statutory law and Islamic law. The 1969 Constitution, which is the reference one for the time period considered in this study, embraced legal pluralism recognizing the application of customary law and Islamic law in specic instances.
Section 82(4) stated that the customary law of an individual's particular tribe could to be applied in cases of adoption, marriage, divorce, burial, devolution of property on death or other matters of personal law, an exception with the statutory principle of non-discrimination (Cooper, 2011) .
In those matters listed under Section 82(4), Islamic law has been applied to Muslims and enforced by Kadhi Courts 5 . Throughout the history of post-colonial Kenya, until the recent constitutional review process, a tension has persisted between the Muslim community, who sought to reinforce and expand the role of Kadhi courts, and Christian leaders, claiming that Islam should not be aorded special rights. (Oded, 2000; Cooper, 2011) .
Before the 1981 Law of Succession Act became operational, there were four separate systems of inheritance for Africans, Europeans, Muslims and Hindus. Since the 1897 Order-in-Council, African customary law in matters of succession was to apply to Africans, as long as it was not repugnant to justice or morality, a judgment which courts have typically been unable to make.
In 1961, the African Wills Ordinance was passed to enable Africans to make written wills, while intestate succession continued being governed by the respective customary law of the deceased. The 1897 Native Courts Regulations Ordinance proclaimed that the law of succession for Muslims was the law contained in the Quran. This continued to apply until independence when the government rearmed the position of the Muslims as part of a constitutional bargain, in order to counter their threat to break away or secede from the rest of Kenya. The government assured them that under the new constitutional order, they would be allowed to keep their own personal law. This guarantee was given constitutional backing by section 66 of the Constitution, which provided for the establishment of the Kadhi courts to decide matters of personal law. Finally, the scant European and Hindu population were ruled by the British Indian Succession Act (1865) and by Hindu customary law respectively. Act (Cap 160), but only came into force in 1981. The process of drafting and approving the bill was lengthy and highly contentious (Oded, 2000) for both political and substantial reasons. First, depriving local authorities and courts of legal competence in matters of inheritance was perceived as a threat to the independence of individual ethnic groups, thus altering the already precarious political equilibrium in a highly fractionalized country. The most common reason cited in opposition to the reform was the fear that daughters would be allowed to inherit too much land, which may enable their husbands, potentially from other clans, to control the traditional land of their wife's family. This argument has been made again today in the occasion of the debate on the new constitution (Cooper, 2011) .
The 1967 Report on Marriage was ignored, and to date the Married Women's Property Act of 1882, a remnant of British colonial rule, remains the only statute to govern married women's right to property acquired during a marriage, and it applies to all Kenyan marriages regardless of the type of marriage or regime governing the marriage.
The Law of Succession Act, operational since July 1st 1981, was passed with the intention of merging and consolidating all the four systems of inheritance law into one uniform statute, applicable to all Kenyans. The Law of Succession Act outlines a Western-style type of succession based on bilateral descent, establishing equal inheritance rights for female and male children, regardless of whether married or unmarried, on their parent's property (Section 38). It is applied automatically in case of intestate succession or by the court, in case there is a will but not reasonable support for any dependents. Most people in Kenya die intestate (Mutongi, 2007) . If there is one surviving spouse and a child or children, the spouse is entitled to an absolute interest in the deceased's personal and household eects, and a life interest in the rest of the estate (e.g. land and house, business, etc.), although this cannot be disposed of without court permission (Sections 35 and 36).
The latter provision was meant to protect widows from eviction or property grabbing. Although non-discriminatory in the treatment of the children of the deceased, there are still the vestiges of discriminatory customs in the provisions concerning spouses: when the surviving spouse is a woman, her interest in the property is invalidated if she remarries, whereas a surviving husband maintains his interest also upon remarriage. Children inherit the estate when a surviving spouse dies and, in a woman's case, remarries. If the deceased did not have a spouse or child, the estate goes rst to the father, then to the mother if the father is deceased. If both parents are deceased, it goes to the brothers and sisters if there are any, then to their children. In cases of polygamous marriages, the estate is divided among the households according to the number of children in each house. There is no provision for additional protection of the property rights of spouses who were married for longer periods and contributed more towards accumulated property. 6 There are primarily two channels through which such a legal change can impact investments in human capital: a bargaining power channel, and an optimal bequest or investment channel.
First, allowing women to inherit represents a positive shock to wives' potential asset ownership, that aects the intra-household bargaining process. As property rights on land are intimately related to an individual's ability to fulll subsistence needs outside the family, in the context of a non-unitary household inheritance rights make an example of those distribution factors (Chiappori et al., 2002) or extra-marital environmental parameters. . . that shift the threat point but that, at least in the short run and to rst order, do not aect prices and non-wage income faced by married individuals. (McElroy, 1990) . Human capital investment choices are aected insofar as the relative bargaining weight of wives increases following the reform. It is worth emphasizing that this bargaining power hypothesis does not rely on women actually realizing their inheritance rights following the reform, but merely on women having the option to claim such rights in a court, based on a codied law. I view inheritance rules as Chiappori et al. (2002) view divorce laws: as distribution factors that can inuence the intra-household balance of power ... even when the marriage does not actually dissolve. By the same line of reasoning, it is possible to detect a bargaining power eect of inheritance rights and yet observe no realized inheritance in equilibrium 7
Holding constant the relative bargaining weights of spouses, the provision of equal inheritance shares for sons and daughters also aects the optimal bequest problem faced by parents. In the context of a wealth model of transfers à la Becker (1974) and Becker and Tomes (1979) , altruistic parents maximize a collective utility function, which includes their children's future incomes as well as their own consumption. The income-generating process of children depends on the stock of human capital (health and education) and physical capital (assets) inherited, and could be dierent for sons and daughters. The model predicts that parents will choose the optimal mix of human and physical capital to bequeath to sons and daughters, given their relative comparative advantages in income-generating activities. The inheritance reform adds an additional constraint to this problem, by introducing a lower bound on the amount of physical capital that should be bequeathed to daughters. The optimal amount of human capital bequeathed to sons and daughters will change, in a direction which depends on whether human and physical capital are complements or substitutes in the income-generating process. For example, human capital in the form of education could be a complement for physical capital in the form of a family business, if more education increases the returns to running such business. Human capital in the form of health and nutrition could be a complement to physical capital in the form of family land, if healthier farmers reap higher returns from agricultural land. In both cases, forcing parents to increase the amount of physical capital 6 The Law of Succession also included provisions concerning the ability of widows to inherit from their deceased husbands, but I do not focus on this aspect. First, it is not clear that these provisions should aect the bargaining power of the wife while the husband is still alive. Moreover, these norms should not alter signicantly the terms of parents' bequest decision problem since the assets inherited by the widow will eventually pass onto the children. 7 In the case of the Indian Hindu Succession Law, Roy (2015) nds that women do not inherit more land following gender-progressive inheritance reform. However, both Roy (2015) and Goyal et al. (2013) authors nd large positive eects on the education of girls. 8 bequeathed to daughters would also make them increase the amount of human capital invested in them. Alternatively, human and physical capital could be substitutes. This would yield the opposite prediction: as parents are forced to bequeath more assets to daughters, they substitute human capital for physical capital and disinvest in their daughters' education and/or health.
As this discussion highlights, the eects of improved inheritance rights on human capital are a priori ambiguous. Education, for instance, could be aected by the inheritance reform in at least three ways. The rst channel is mothers' bargaining power: as mothers have a greater bargaining weight, intra-household decisions concerning human capital investments will reect to a larger extent the preferences of women. Since it is well documented that these preferences tend to be tilted towards the well being of children, and especially girls, we should expect outcomes such as health and education to unambiguously improve for girls and possibly boys as well. The second channel is the complementarity of education and physical assets: if education increases the returns to physical capital for daughters, once parents are forced to assign to daughters a larger share of physical capital they will also want to provide daughters with more education. Conversely, as boys receive a smaller share of assets, their education should decrease. A third channel is substitution between human and physical capital: parents might decide to invest less in the human capital of girls and more in that of boys, to compensate the fact that law now forces them to bequeath the same amount of physical capital to both. 8 How human capital outcomes respond to changes in inheritance rules is thus ultimately an empirical question, which I attempt to address in the next sections. The advantages of DHS data are manifold. First, the relatively large sample size allows me to obtain fairly precise estimates even if the variation I rely on comes from a minority in the population. Second, the high degree of comparability across waves mitigates measurement error problems associated with pooling together dierent waves. Finally, DHS surveys are among the very few surveys administered in Kenya which report detailed data on religious and ethnic aliation, information which the National Statistical Oce is typically not willing to disclose, given its political sensitivity. The most obvious limitation of my data is that all waves are administered post-reform, with the exception of the 1989 wave, which is administered shortly before the 1990 amendment. This implies that I will not be able to employ my dierence-in-dierences strategy to analyze outcomes measured at the time of the survey -such as current health measures -but only cumulative or past outcomes -such as the accumulated stock of education or the timing of fertility onset. Furthermore, I will typically not be able to include any pre-reform household characteristics as controls.
Data sources

Empirical Strategy
My identication strategy exploits within-country variation in pre-reform customary inheritance law across dierent religious groups. Following Duo (2001) , Bleakley (2010) and, specically in the case of inheritance, La Ferrara and Milazzo (2014), my basic specication relies on a dierencein-dierences between cohorts exposed and not exposed to the reform, across Muslims and non-Muslims. The identifying assumption is that, absent the change in inheritance rules, the outcomes of interest would have evolved over time following the same linear trend across religious groups. Such a strategy is thus robust to dierences in time-invariant characteristics of dierent religious and ethnic groups.
The reform under study includes two subsequent legal changes: the 1981 Law of Succession, granting all women a share of parental inheritance equal to that of their brothers, and the 1991 Amendment, exempting Muslims from the rule. This generates three dierent inheritance regimes, as summarized by Table 1 . In the pre-1981 regime, non-Muslim women inherit a 0 share of assets, while Muslim women inherit half the share which is entitled to their brothers. In the post 1 regime, between 1981 and 1990, the Law of Succession applies to both Muslims and non-Muslims alike and grants women the same inheritance share as their brothers. In the post 2 regime, after 1990, the Law of Succession continues to apply to non-Muslims, for whom the same share is granted 9 A natural concern could be that more recent Muslim cohorts are not comparable to earlier ones, as they include nomadic and arguably more traditional households. to sons and daughters, but no longer applies to Muslims, who revert to the pre-1981 rule that grants daughters half the share entitled to their brothers. My empirical specication thus includes two dierent post periods: one for the regime in place between 1981 and 1990 (post 1) and one for the post-1990 one (post 2).
Consider human capital outcome y of individual i born in year t, belonging to ethnicity e, surveyed in wave w and living in province r, district d at the time of the survey. My benchmark dierence-in-dierences specication is:
where e i , α r, η w , µ t are respectively ethnicity, province, wave and cohort xed eects; ϕ r · t is a province-specic time trend; ASAL d · t is a time trend specic to Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASAL) 10 and X itvrdw are additional controls observed in wave w -for instance, urban residence.
The denition of the post1 t and post2 t dummies will vary based on the specic dependent variable considered, depending on how old a cohort should be at the time of the reform in order to be aected in each particular outcome. The coecients of interest are those on the interaction terms β 1 and β 2 . Coecientβ 1 captures the dierence between Muslims and non-Muslims in dierences between the post 1 period and the pre period; thus, it estimates the impact of the following experiment: allowing women who used 10 ASAL comprise the poorest areas in the country, which the government has identied as needing specic attention and has occasionally targeted with specic policies. For instance, in 1971 school fees were abolished up to the 4th
year of primary school in ASAL districts; this policy was extended to the rest of the country in 1973 (Ferré, 2009 ). 11 It should be noted that a woman whose parents have died before the reform will not experience any increased bargaining power by changes in inheritance rules, as her potential inheritance has been already realized. Unfortunately, in my data I do not have any information on the timing of parents' death and I will necessarily consider as treated also women who are not aected by the reform given that their parents have already died. This should attenuate my estimates, but not invalidate my identication strategy, to the extent that the timing of parents' death is not systematically dierent for Muslims and non-Muslims.
to inherit half the share of their brothers to inherit the same share -what could be we could call the incremental reform. Coecient β 2 captures the dierence between Muslims and non-Muslims in dierences between the post 2 period and the pre period; thus, it estimates the impact of the following experiment: allowing women who used to inherit a 0 share to inherit the same share as their brothers -the full reform. Unless there are strong non-linearities in the eects of inheritance rights, we should expect β 1 and β 2 to have the same sign, and β 2 to be larger in magnitude than β 1 . In practice, a complication arises in the interpretation of coecient β 2 : cohorts exposed to the full (post2) reform are in some cases so young, that the previous generation has also been exposed to the reform -specically, to the incremental (post1) reform. Given that I typically do not know the year of birth of the mothers of respondents, I cannot exclude these young cohorts from my sample. Thus, for a number of outcomes, the coecient β 2 will eectively capture a cumulative eect: that of being exposed to the full reform as well as the eect of having parents exposed to the incremental reform.
The main threats to identication are related to confounding trends across religious groups. In particular, I would be overestimating the eects of the reform if non-Muslim ethnic groups started doing systematically better than Muslims after the reform. In order to address these concerns. I complement my main identication strategy with a number of robustness checks, described in more detail when discussing each specic outcome. First, when sample size allows, I restrict the sample to individuals too old to be aected by the reform and estimate the eects of hypothetical placebo reforms, typically nding precise zero eects. Second, I repropose my benchmark specication focusing on one ethnic group at a time, rather than pooling together all non-Muslim groups in a single category. There is signicant heterogeneity in pre-reform outcome levels across non-Muslim ethnic groups. I show that, in spite of this heterogeneity, the reform had similar eects across dierent ethnic groups, regardless of how their pre-reform outcome levels ranked, relative to those observed among Muslims. Third, when available, I exploit information on the number of siblings that a woman has as a source of treatment heterogeneity. I show that the eects of obtaining inheritance rights are less pronounced when a woman has a larger number of siblings, especially brothers, which suggests that I am indeed picking up the eects of changes in a woman's potential inheritance share rather than a confounding trend. 14 As discussed above, as per Section 32 in the Law of Succession Act, the reform did not apply to particular types of assets, if located in one of a list of exempt districts. Given the impossibility to identify the district in which parental assets are located, nor the nature of such assets, it is not possible to identify which individuals are unaected by the reform due to this exemption.
For this reason, information on household district together with the exemption rule cannot per se be used as an additional source of identication, and I choose to include observations from all 14 Another possible source of confounding trends is related to dierential enforcement across religious groups.
Unfortunately, there is no quantitative evidence on actual enforcement. The fact that the Muslim community was strongly opposed to the reform, demanding and ultimately obtaining an exemption, could imply that enforcement of the reform was systematically more dicult among Muslims. If this is the case, the magnitude of coecient β 1 is more dicult to interpret: intuitively, if enforcement is worse for Muslim women, the latter are exposed to a smaller incremental reform than Christian women, and I would be overestimating the eects of the true incremental reform.
Dierential enforcement is less of a concern for the interpretation of coecient β 1 , since in 1990 Muslims revert to the pre-1981 legislation and, presumably, enforcement standards. districts, including exempt ones, in my benchmark specications. However, I also report estimates for households located in exempt districts at the time of the survey, and typically nd a treatment eect close to zero. Subject to the caveat discussed above, this can be cautiously interpreted as further evidence that I am indeed capturing the eects of the reform.
In the next sub-sections, I describe the construction my outcome variables from the DHS data.
Education
All DHS waves include information on years of education and educational attainment of all household members, both males and females. I look both at education, measured in years, and educational attainment. I dene the treatment as being between age 5 and 13 during the post 1 or post 2 period. I restrict my sample to individuals above age 20, to ensure they have completed their education and to avoid censoring problems. 15 Religious aliation is only available for female respondents. As I am not always able to match males to a female relative whose religion is known, the resulting sample of males that I can use in my education specications is signicantly smaller than that of women.
DHS wave 4 also includes a siblings questionnaire, which allows me to retrieve the number of siblings of each adult female respondent. I can exploit information on the number of siblings as an additional source of variation in the intensity of the inheritance treatment. Given that respondents to DHS wave 4 are all too old to be exposed to the 1990 Amendment, in this sample I will only compare post 1 cohorts to pre-reform ones. In order to test whether the reform dierentially aects female education depending on the number of siblings, I estimate a triple dierences specication:
where siblings i represents the number of siblings of respondent i. The coecient of interest is δ 5 , which captures the dierential impact of the reform for those having one additional sibling. Consider birth j occurring in year τ to mother i born in year t and denote with υ τ a childbirth
year xed eect. I estimate: behavior. I argue that both could be aected by improved female bargaining power after the reform, although they reect decisions taken by dierent agents within the household: FGM takes place mostly during childhood and teenage, and as such reects mostly parental choices; seeking professional prenatal care is likely to reect choices taken by adult women negotiating with their spouses. It is plausible that these outcomes would be aected primarily through a bargaining power channel, rather than an optimal bequest one, as there is limited scope for complementarities with physical assets. 17
Total fertility is another outcome that the reform is likely to aect, both through a bargaining power channel, with family size plausibly getting closer to the preferences of wives, and through an optimal bequest channel, if parents want to avoid fragmentation in family property. Data limitations discussed in Section 6.4 prevent me from observing total fertility, and I consider age at marriage and fertility onset as an imperfect proxy.
Finally, in the attempt to pin down the bargaining power channel with more condence, I provide some suggestive evidence on household bargaining power, drawing upon from self-reported survey questions on decision making and attitudes.
Education [Insert Tables 2 and 3a]
Summary statistics from my main education sample are reported in Muslims have been lagging behind in education is a well-known fact, which has sometimes been blamed on discriminatory practices in missionary schools (Oded, 2000) . Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3a report my benchmark specications for number of years of education, separately estimated for males and females. The coecient on the post 1 interaction is positive and signicant for females, negative and insignicant for males. As expected, the coecient on the post 2 interaction has the same sign and is larger in magnitude, becoming signicant also for males. According to these estimates, females receive roughly one more year of education following the full reformgoing from a zero share to the same share as their brothers -whereas males receive roughly one and a half less year of education. This sizable reduction of the gender education gap suggests that parents substitute the education of males for that of females, in a way which is compatible both with a bargaining power channel and with an optimal bequest one. Columns (3) to (6) replicate the analysis for two alternative dependent variables related to educational attainment: a dummy for whether an individual has completed primary and secondary school respectively. The estimates conrm the pattern of columns (1) and (2) and are highly signicant for females, slightly noisier for males. A girl exposed to the rst reform (post 1) is roughly 8 percentage points more likely to complete primary school, and a similar gure holds for completing secondary school.
[Insert Table 3b ] Table 3b reports a number of robustness and falsication checks. First, restricting my sample to exempt districts, I nd insignicant eects for both males and females (cols. (1) and (2)); the coecient for females, in particular, is signicantly reduced in magnitude. This should, however, be interpreted with caution, given the small sample size and the large standard errors. Columns (3) to (6) show that the estimates in Table 3a are robust to a dierent, coarser treatment denition -being of age 5 to 18 during a post period, i.e. being exposed by high-school age -and to the inclusion of a household-level wealth index. While I view this as an endogenous control, it is reassuring to note that the estimated eect of the reform is minimally aected by controlling for wealth. In columns (7) and (8), I restrict the sample to individuals older than 18 in 1981 and thus unaected by the reform. I then estimate the impact of a placebo reform, where the treatment is dened as being born after 1955. I nd precisely estimated zero eects, which supports the parallel trends identifying assumption that my identication strategy relies on.
Overall, these estimates suggest a sizable improvement in the education of girls whose schooling a half year dierence -is similar to the eects found in the above mentioned studies.
[Insert Tables 4 and 5] In the analysis conducted so far, I have compared Muslims with all non-Muslim ethnic groups pooled together. This masks signicant heterogeneity across non-Muslim ethnic groups in pre-reform education levels, as highlighted by Table 4 . While Muslims are initially less educated than non-Muslims considered as a group, there are individual non-Muslim ethnic groups for which the gap is more pronounced. In [Insert Table 6 ]
In Tables 6a and 6b I exploit sibling composition as a source of variation in treatment intensity.
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We should expect a smaller inheritance eect, in absolute terms, for women with a larger number of siblings. Recall that the siblings sub-sample is drawn from DHS wave 4 only, consists only of females and does not include cohorts of the post 2 period. Summary statistics are reported in Appendix Table A1 and show no large dierences in the average number of siblings of Muslims and non-Muslims. Column (1) in Table 6a reports my benchmark years of education regression -similar to column (1) in Table 3a -as estimated in the smaller siblings sub-sample. The main qualitative result -that the reform increases the education of females -is replicated in this smaller sample.
Before turning to the triple dierences specication of equation (2), it is interesting to analyze split samples individually. Column (2) Table 6b reports similar specications considering separately brothers and sisters. The attenuating eect of having a large number of siblings seems larger in absolute terms in the case of brothers. This is consistent with the fact that, in spite of formal equal inheritance rights, males still tend to be favored in practice in inheritance matters.
Female Genital Mutilation
[Insert Tables 7 and 8] 18 Unfortunately, this strategy is only possible when examining education as an outcome variable due to sample size limitations: only one DHS wave contains sibling information, and only education is available for a sucient number of respondents, across a sucient number of cohorts.
Female Genital Mutilation, ocially deemed illegal in Kenya in 2011 (IFHRO, 2011), is widespread among women in my sample, and practiced across ethnicities and religious groups. Summary statistics for the FGM sample are reported in Table 7a . FGM appears to be equally prevalent in the Muslim as well as non-Muslim community, but aggregate gures mask signicant dierences across ethnicities, highlighted in Table 7b . Table 8 shows that both the incremental and the full reform are associated with a highly signicant decrease in the probability of mutilation, by as much as 8 percentage points in the post 1 period and 18 percentage points in the post 2 period, according to the specication in column (1) . While I am not aware of any other estimate that I can directly compare this gure to, this does seem large, as it is more than twice the size of the impact of the urban residence dummy. These estimates remain virtually unchanged when I add household level controls, including a wealth index (column (2)). When restricting my sample to exempt districts, I obtain a precisely estimated 0 eect (column (3)). Analogously, a precise 0 eect is found when restricting the sample to unaected cohorts and estimating a placebo treatment (column (4)). As FGM arguably reect choices made by parents during teenage and childhood, the most natural interpretation of these ndings is as evidence of improved bargaining power of mothers following the reform, which translates into better health outcomes for their daughters.
[Insert Table 9 ] Table 9 reports the specication in Table 8 , column (1), considering one ethnic group at a time.
This exercise is particularly useful for this outcome variable because of the signicant heterogeneity in pre-reform FGM prevalence across ethnic groups. Table 9 shows that the result in Table 8 is mostly driven by the Kamba, Kikuyu and Meru groups, which all have a pre-reform FGM prevalence between 50 and 70% (Table 7b ). Not surprisingly, no signicant impact is detected when focusing on the Luhya and Luo groups, among which FGM was virtually never practiced (pre-reform prevalence is around 1%). Similarly, no signicant impact is found when looking at the Kalenjin and Kisii, which are the groups where FGM was almost universally practiced (84% and 98% prevalence respectively). A plausible interpretation is that the inheritance reform reduced FGM rates only in contexts in which this practice was not universal to start with, but was not able to induce signicant behavioral changes in groups in which FGM was very deep-rooted.
Maternal Health
[Insert Tables 10 and 11] I next turn to an adult female health outcome: whether a woman received professional medical assistance during pregnancy and labor. In my maternal health sub-sample, the unit of observation is the birth. The estimated specication includes xed eects for the year of the birth itself, and also for the year of birth of the mother. Therefore, it does not simply capture whether dierent cohorts of women have dierent practices concerning pregnancy and delivery, but also whether the same cohort of women behaves dierently during pregnancies which occurred before or after the reform. Summary statistics for this sample are reported in Table 10 . Professional prenatal care and hospital births appear to be slightly less prevalent among Muslims. Table 11 shows that women adopt safer antenatal and birth practices for births occurring after the reform: for women of a given cohort, births which occurred after the full reform are roughly 7 percentage points more likely to take place in a hospital and to be preceded by professional antenatal care. These results are only minimally attenuated by the inclusion of controls (cols. (2),(4) ). Moreover, the reform is estimated
to have a precise zero eect in exempt districts (col. (5)). 19
Nuptiality and Fertility Timing
[Insert Tables 12 and 13 ]
Changes in inheritance rules are likely to aect total fertility. First, the bargaining power channel suggests that post-reform fertility choices will be tilted towards women's preferencestypically involving a smaller number of children at the optimum. In fact, Sen (2001) argues that women's empowerment, including property rights, is a key instrument for reducing fertility rates.
Secondly, as parents take the reform into account in their fertility decisions, they could reduce their target fertility in order prevent the fragmentation of family assets. For instance, it has been frequently argued that the French birth rate dropped very rapidly in the 19th century following the Napoleonic change in the inheritance laws, from primogeniture to equal division of estates amongst all children (Garner, 1914) . Unfortunately, data limitations do not allow me to observe total fertility, given that cohorts of women exposed to the reform have typically not completed their fertility at the time of the survey. However, I can examine fertility onset and investigate whether there have been shifts in the timing of entry into motherhood and marriage. Table 12 presents summary statistics for the nuptiality and fertility sample. The timing of childbearing and marriage seems to be overall similar for Muslims and non-Muslims, with around 50% of women in the sample entering motherhood before age 20. Table 13a shows that women exposed to the incremental as well as the full reform are less likely to get married before they are 18 and 20, with orders of magnitudes ranging from a 7 to a 17 percentage point decrease. A similar pattern is displayed by nuptiality dependent variable. This is not surprising since age at rst birth and age at rst marriage are highly correlated. Since the denition of treatment period for these outcomes (being of marriageable age) overlaps substantially with the denition of treatment in the education sample (being 5-18), there is a concern that the coecients in Table 13a may be purely driven by the mechanical eect of girls staying in school longer as a consequence of the reform, rather than a direct eect of inheritance rights on fertility and nuptiality decisions. My results, however, survive the inclusion of a variety of controls, among which wealth and education (Table 13b , columns (1),(3),(5), (7)). A placebo treatment administered to unexposed cohorts yields insignicant -although not very precise -results (Table 13b , columns (2), (4), (6), (8) ). Overall, these results are suggestive that women exposed to the reform tend to postpone marriage and childbirth. While this could reect a mere shift in timing, it seems plausible that it would also translate into a lower total fertility rate. 19 Unfortunately the maternal health sample does not have enough pre-reform years to perform a meaningful falsication test using placebo reforms.
6.5
Other Outcomes: Decision Making, Violence, Attitudes
The results discussed so far are consistent with the reform having a bargaining power eect but also possibly an investment eect, with parents complementing physical capital with human capital in their optimal bequests. While it is, in general, dicult to disentangle these two eects, some suggestive evidence on bargaining power can be provided by considering self-reported measures of decision making ability and attitudes from the DHS gender module. If the reform increases women's bargaining power, one expects that couples formed after the reform should be characterized by a more balanced decision making process, and attitudes more favorable to women.
Results are provided in Appendix tables A3 to A6, while summary statistics are in table A2.
Treatment status is dened as being of marriageable age -dened broadly -during one of the reform periods. This is to avoid endogeneity in the timing of marriage, which is aected by the reform, as documented in Section 6.4. I report both individual outcome variables -drawn from specic DHS questions -and, in the last column, a summary measure, coded such that higher values represent positive outcomes for women (e.g. more decision making power, or lower domestic violence). Table   3A shows that women exposed to the reform during their marriageable age are signicantly less likely to report that their husbands have the nal say on a variety of household decisions -from large purchases to the wife's health. Spousal and domestic violence (Tables A4 and A5 ) appear to be less prevalent in couples formed after the reform, although estimates are generally noisy and the summary measures are insignicant. Finally, Table A6 shows a slight shift in women's self reported attitudes towards refusing sex with their husbands, showing that after the reform women are more likely to consider it justied. While small sample size and concerns related to self-reporting should make us cautious in interpreting these estimates, these results support the interpretation that the reform had a direct bargaining power eect, consistent with the ndings of Heath and Tan (2015) and Mokerjee (2015) in the Indian context.
Conclusions
In this paper I attempt to quantify the impact of an inheritance law reform granting women equal inheritance rights, in the context of Kenya. I exploit variation in inheritance rights across religious groups and cohorts to assess how improved statutory inheritance rights aected a variety of human capital outcomes. I start by considering education of boys and girls and I compare cohorts who were of school going age before and after the reform. I nd that the education of girls improves in absolute terms and relative to that of boys. These eects are attenuated if a woman has a large number of siblings, which supports the interpretation that I am indeed capturing the eects of the inheritance regime change. This is consistent with the reform having a bargaining power eect, but may also reect an investment channel, with parents complementing physical capital with human capital in their optimal bequest choice. I then consider two female health-related outcomes: Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) and maternal health, proxied by medical assistance during pregnancy and labor. I nd a signicant decrease in the probability of being mutilated for girls who were children or teenagers after the reform, mostly in ethnic groups where FGM is not 20 universal to start with. I nally turn to outcomes related to marriage, nding that women who are of marriageable age after the reform tend to postpone marriage and fertility, suggesting that total fertility rates may be lower, and report having more decision making power within the household.
Overall, my results provide a quite coherent picture of a general improvement in women's status, health and education. These results are all consistent with a bargaining power eect, although these improvements can also reect changes in the mix of human and physical capital that parents bequeath to their children in the post-reform inheritance regime. Given that the reform makes both parents and children become treated at the same time, an inherent limitation of my identication strategy is that it is not entirely possible to disentangle these two channels. However, the nding that women participate more in household decision making in unions formed after the reform are suggestive that women's bargaining power is indeed enhanced. Overall, these ndings suggest that legal reform at the statutory level can have an impact even in a context of poor legal enforcement and in spite of the persistence of deep-rooted social norms. As many Sub-Saharan African countries are undergoing pro-woman reform or drafting new constitutions, these results indicate that formal legislation can be an important starting point even in contexts in which customs are perceived to be very hard to change. 
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